Oligarchy and the Development Trap: Institutional Erosion and the July 2024 Uprising in Bangladesh

This paper introduces an "Oligarchic Capture" framework to analyze the mechanisms through which concentrated elite power in authoritarian settings undermines developmental institutions and outcomes. Drawing on political economy theory, the framework delineates how elites capture political, economic, and informational channels to skew policymaking toward narrow interests. For empirical illustration, we apply this framework to Bangladesh, using the July 2024 popular uprising as an empirical lens. This uprising—driven by public frustration with corruption, exclusion, and deteriorating social services—epitomizes the costs of oligarchic governance and illustrates a demand for accountability and reform. Our findings confirm that entrenched elites channel resources toward patronage projects and rent-extracting ventures, while eroding oversight institutions. These actions stall broad-based growth. Our analysis reveals a self-reinforcing "development trap," wherein authoritarian elite capture produces short-term gains at the cost of long-term stagnation. In response, we propose a comprehensive reform agenda to break this cycle. Key measures include strengthening judicial and civil service independence, enforcing transparency in public procurement, and empowering civil society oversight. These reforms aim to restore institutional autonomy and inclusive governance. Overall, the study contributes to the fields of development economics and political science by mapping elite capture pathways and providing public policy insights through actionable strategies to overcome entrenched distortions. This integrated approach underscores the importance of confronting oligarchic power to achieve sustainable and inclusive development outcomes.